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Population Aging and Potential Growth in Asia
KEISUKE OTSU AND KATSUYUKI SHIBAYAMA∗
We study the effects of projected population aging on potential growth in Asian
economies over the period 2015–2050.We find that an increase in the share of the
population over 64 years of age will significantly lower output growth through
decreased labor participation. Population aging can also reduce economic growth
through increased labor income taxes and dampened productivity growth.
Keywords: economic growth, population aging
JEL codes: E13, O40
I. Introduction
Many Asian economies are faced with the challenge of rapidly aging
populations, which can be harmful to an economy over the long run as an increase in
the share of the elderly population reduces both the labor participation rate and output
per adult, and increases social security dependency. In this paper, we quantitatively
assess the impacts of an expanding share of the population aged 65 years and older
on long-run output over the period 2015–2050.
Many studies have discussed the effects of Japan’s rapidly aging population.
Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2009) use an overlapping generations model and show
that population aging was a factor in the decline in the Japanese savings rate and
output during the 1990s. Katagiri (2012) constructs a new Keynesian model and
argues that unexpected upward revisions to population aging forecasts operate as a
shock to demand, causing deflation, unemployment, and a decline in output. Otsu
and Shibayama (2016) construct a representative household model and show that
population aging has played a significant role in accounting for the decline in Japan’s
output since the 1990s through a reduced labor participation rate.
Studies on the economic impacts of population aging in other Asian
economies have been relatively sparse. Estrada, Park, and Ramayandi (2011) show
that while population aging had a positive effect on global consumption over the
period 1998–2007, the 31 developing Asian economies in the sample exhibited
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a weaker positive relationship than the rest of the sample. Park and Shin (2011)
conduct an empirical analysis of demographic transitions and economic growth for
12 developing Asian economies and find that a rise in the old age dependency ratio
should lead to a decline in economic growth through reduced labor participation,
total factor productivity growth, and capital accumulation. Our paper projects
potential output growth in 17 Asian economies using simulation methods based on
a dynamic general equilibrium model similar to that used by Otsu and Shibayama
(2016).
The main findings of our paper are that population aging in Asian economies
is harmful for potential growth in terms of (i) reduced labor participation and
capital accumulation, (ii) increased labor income taxes, and (iii) reduced total factor
productivity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly
discusses the projections for demographic transitions inAsian economies. Section III
describes the dynamic general equilibrium model that we employ and section IV
presents our quantitative analysis. Section V concludes.
II. Demographic Data for Asian Economies
In this paper, we rely on population projections from theWorld Bank’s Health,
Nutrition, and Population Statistics.1 We use projections for Asian economies of the
shares of the population between the ages of 15 and 64, and aged 65 years and
older. The former group is usually considered the economically active population,
while the latter is considered to be the aged population. The sum of the two groups
represents the total adult population. We define population aging as the change in
the share of the aged population among the total adult population.
Figure 1 plots population aging in 43 Asian Development Bank member
economies over the period 1960–2050. Japan had the highest share of aged
population among the total adult population in 2015 at 30%; this figure is projected
to increase to more than 40% by 2050. Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea;
Singapore; and Taipei,China will each also have about 40% of their total population
aged 65 years or older in 2050. While all economies in the sample are projected
to experience population aging during the review period, Afghanistan, Papua New
Guinea, and Timor-Leste are projected to have an aged population that comprises
only about 10% of the total population in 2050.
An increase in the aged population share in an economy can be driven by
lower fertility rates, increased longevity, or both. Figure 2 shows that the average
projected adult population growth rate for Asian economies is declining over time,
which implies that the fertility effect is stronger than the longevity effect. While the
decline in the adult population growth rate affects our results through the capital
1For Taipei,China, we use population projections from http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=2351&CtUnit
=1072&BaseDSD=36&mp=2
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Figure 1. Population Aging in Asia
HKG = Hong Kong, China; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China.
Note: “Average” refers to the simple average for Asian Development Bank member economies.
Source: World Bank. Health, Nutrition, and Population Statistics. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/health
-nutrition-and-population-statistics
Figure 2. Population Growth Rate in Asia
HKG = Hong Kong, China; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China.
Note: “Average” refers to the simple average for Asian Development Bank member economies.
Sources: Feenstra, R. C., R. Inklaar, andM. P. Timmer. 2015. The Next Generation of the PennWorld Table. American
Economic Review 105 (10): 3150–82; World Bank. Health, Nutrition, and Population Statistics. http://data.worldbank
.org/data-catalog/health-nutrition-and-population-statistics
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Figure 3. Aging and GDP
GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Feenstra, R. C., R. Inklaar, and M. P. Timmer. 2015. The Next Generation of the Penn World Table. American
Economic Review 105 (10): 3150–82.
dilution effect, we will not further discuss the sources of population growth and
aging in this paper as they do not directly affect our analysis.
Figure 3 plots real gross domestic product (GDP) per adult in purchasing
power parity terms and aged population shares for 33 Asian Development Bank
member economies in 2011. Figure 3 shows that developed economies tend to face
more severe population aging. Although the impact of economic development on
demographics is an interesting topic, we take demographic projections as given and
analyze their impacts on economic growth.
III. Model
The model we use for our quantitative analysis builds on that of Otsu
and Shibayama (2016). It consists of a representative household of young and
aged adults, a representative firm, and the government. In this model, the young
work and the old are retired, while the head of the household makes decisions on
the optimal allocation of hours worked by the young, consumption, and investment.
The firm hires labor and capital from the household. The government taxes labor to
spend for exogenous reasons and rebates the remaining amount to the household.
A. Household
The utility of the members of the household depends on consumption and
leisure. The leisure of the young depends on the hours worked; the old do not work.
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ηy,t {lncy,t + (1−) ln(h¯ − ht )}
(1− ηy,t ){lnco,t + (1−) ln h¯}
]
(1)
where ηy,t is the share of the young in the family; cy,t and co,t denote individual
consumption of the young and the old, respectively; ht is the number of hours worked
annually per worker; and h¯ is the maximum hours available to allocate to leisure.2
The household faces the following budget constraints:
ηy,t cy,t + (1− ηy,t )co,t + it = (1− τt )wt htηy,t + rt kt + ωt (2)
where it is the household’s investment, (1− τt )wt is the after-tax wage rate, rt is
the rental rate on capital, kt is the household capital stock, and ωt is the transfer
from the government. Household capital stock evolves over time according to a law
of motion for capital:
(1+ nt )kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt (3)
where nt is the population growth rate and δ is the physical depreciation rate. The
population growth rate in this equation represents the dilution effect on capital
accumulation. The head of the household maximizes (1), subject to (2) and (3).
Optimization for intragenerational consumption leads to
cy,t = co,t ≡ ct
due to the separability of the preference function.3 Optimization for the




(h¯ − ht )
= (1− τt )wt
2This is similar to the indivisible labor models of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) in the sense that
employment and working hours are considered separately. However, in our model, employment is given and the head
of the household chooses the number of hours worked; in the indivisible labor model, hours worked are given and the
household chooses employment.
3If we assume a nonseparable preference function such as
u(cy,t , co,t , ht , ηy,t ) = ηy,t
(










then the head of the household will allocate more consumption to the aged in order to equate marginal utilities of
consumption.
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[rt+1 + 1− δ]
B. Firm
The representative firm will produce a single good by combining capital and
labor according to the following Cobb–Douglas production function:
Yt = At K
θ
t (htηy,t Nt )
1−θ
where Yt is total output, At is the total factor productivity, and Nt is the total
population in the economy.
The firm maximizes profits
π = Y − wt htηy,t Nt − rt Kt
by choosing the optimal labor and capital levels. This leads to the labor and capital
first-order conditions:






which can be rewritten in per adult terms:









The government purchases goods and services for exogenous reasons, and
pays for them through a labor income tax. The government rebates all excess revenue
to the household through a lump-sum transfer. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is
G = τtwt htηy,t Nt + ωt Nt (6)
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For simplicity, we assume that the government decides the amount of expenditure
as a fraction of current output so that
G t = gt Yt
Combining the government budget constraint (6) with the household budget
constraint (2) and firm first-order conditions (4) and (5), we get the per adult resource
constraint:
(1− gt )yt = ct + it (7)
D. Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a set of quantities and prices:




(i) The household optimizes given the series of {ωt , wt , rt , ηy,t , nt , τt}
T
t=0 and k0.
(ii) The firm optimizes given {wt , rt , At}
T
t=0 each period.
(iii) The government budget constraint (6) holds.
(iv) The resource constraint (7) holds.

















(h¯ − ht )




and the law of motion of capital (3), the resource constraint (7), and the per adult
production function:
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Table 1. Spillover Effects of Population Aging
Dependent Variable
A g t A
α: Constant −0.021∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.020∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
β: Productivity gap −0.073∗∗ - - −0.072∗∗
γ : Dependency - 0.157∗∗ 0.768∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
R∧2 0.117 0.596 0.862 0.118
- = not applicable.
Note: ∗∗∗ = 10% level of significance, ∗∗ = 5% level of significance.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
IV. Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative approach we take in this paper follows several steps. First,
we project the time paths of the exogenous variables over the period 2011–2050.
Second, we define parameter values in the model. Third, we numerically solve the
model based on the time paths of exogenous variables. For the last step, we rely on
the shooting algorithm described in Otsu and Shibayama (2016).
A. Projecting Exogenous Variables
In this model, we have five exogenous variables, {ηy,t , nt , τt , gt , At}. The
baseline projection of total factor productivity, At , is based on an endogenous growth
model in which the growth rate of productivity depends on the productivity gap with
the technology frontier. The demographic variables in our full simulation, {ηy,t , nt},
are computed from the World Bank’s Health, Nutrition, and Population Statistics
reported in Figures 1 and 2. We also consider spillover effects of demographics
through {τt , gt , At}. The regression results are reported in Table 1.
The baseline projection of total factor productivity relies on a variation of
Romer (1990) in which economies have access to common technology but the cost
of innovation needed to realize technology gains in each economy depends on the
productivity gap between the global leader and the home economy; that is, the lower
the productivity level, the cheaper it is to adopt better technology. We assume that
the productivity level of the United States (US) represents the global productivity
frontier and estimate the following panel regression:
Âi,t = αA + βA × ln
Ai,t
Aus,t
+ fi + εi,t
where fi is the economy fixed effect. We computed total factor productivity for
a sample of 41 economies over the period 1975–2010 using data from the Penn
World Table for capital and output, and data from the Conference Board’s Total
Economy Database for hours worked per worker. The first column in Table 1 shows
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the results in which the productivity gap has a negative coefficient, meaning that
the greater the productivity is relative to the US level, the lower the productivity
growth rate. Finally, we project the productivity growth rate of our Asian economies
based on the productivity gap, assuming that US productivity will continue to
grow at 1.3% per year over the period 2011–2050. Since we need observations of
productivity in 2011 in order to project the productivity growth rate, we are limited to
17Asian economies for all simulations. In addition, we do not use the estimated fixed
effects since not all economies in the simulation sample are included in this panel
regression.
For government consumption, we hypothesize that when population aging
occurs, the demand for public services such as health care increases. Therefore, we
conduct the following panel regression:
gi,t = αg + γg ×
1− ηy,i,t
ηy,i,t




corresponds to the aged dependency ratio. We use data of the
GDP share of government consumption for 25 Asian economies over the period
1975–2011 from the Penn World Table. The regression results are listed in the
second column of Table 1. This shows that an increase in the aged dependency ratio
leads to an increase in the government consumption share. Since all 17 economies
in our simulation sample are included in this panel regression, we project the
government consumption share using the estimated regression coefficients and fixed
effects.
For labor income tax, we hypothesize that when population aging occurs, the
tax burden on workers increases, particularly due to higher payroll taxes. Therefore,
we conduct a similar panel regression
τi,t = ατ + γτ ×
1− ηy,i,t
ηy,i,t
+ fi + εi,t
using the updated payroll tax rate data for 14 members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the period 1960–2011
(McDaniel 2007). The regression results, which are presented in the third column in
Table 1, show that an increase in the aged dependency ratio leads to an increase in
the social security payroll tax rate. Since not all of the economies in our simulation
sample are included in this regression, we project the future social security payroll
tax rate using the regression coefficients without using any of the estimated fixed
effects.
Finally, we consider a case in which productivity is affected by demographics.
This can occur if population aging leads to an increase in demand for services that
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Figure 4a. Demographic Variables
are not highly productive, including public services such as health care or publicly
subsidized services such as elderly care. We run the following panel regression:






+ fi + εi,t
with the same sample as the baseline productivity regression. The results, which are
presented in the fourth column in Table 1, show that population aging does have
a negative effect on productivity growth. In addition, the effect of the productivity
gap on productivity growth seems robust as the coefficient is very close to that in
the baseline regression.
The time paths of the projections are listed in Figure 4. We take a simple
average of each variable of our 17 sample economies. The demographic variables
show population aging and population shrinking, with the aged population share
more than doubling between 2015 and 2050 as adult population growth approaches
zero near the end of the period (Figure 4a). The government policy variables show a
slight rise in government consumption and a rapid rise in the labor income tax rate
(Figure 4b). The productivity projections show that productivity growth is noticeably
hindered by the demographic effects (Figure 4c).
B. Parameter Values
The parameters we need to pin down in order to conduct our quantitative
analysis are {θ, δ, β, h¯, }. We keep these parameters similar across economies
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Figure 4b. Government Variables
Figure 4c. Productivity
GDP = gross domestic product.
Sources: For Figure 4a, World Bank. Health, Nutrition, and Population Statistics. http://data.worldbank.org/data
-catalog/health-nutrition-and-population-statistics; for Figures 4b and 4c, authors’ calculations.
so that we can assess the impacts of exogenous variables on economic growth
using a standard approach. The parameter values used in this paper are listed in
Table 2.
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Table 2. Parameter Values
θ Capital income share 1/3
δ Depreciation rate 0.05
β Discount factor 0.97
h Annual hours 3,500
 Preference weight 0.50
Source: Authors’ calculations.
For the capital income share, θ , we do not have direct measures for all
economies in the sample. Gollin (2002) shows that after several adjustments, capital
income shares in most economies within his sample lie in the range of 0.20–0.35.
We choose a share equivalent to one-third, which is at the high end of this estimate,
since his data were for the late 1980s and early 1990s and studies such as Pickety
(2014) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) argue that capital income shares have
risen over time.
We compute the average capital depreciation rate over the period 1975–2011
for each economy in the simulation sample from the Penn World Table. This rate
ranges from 2.5% in Viet Nam to 5.7% in India, with an average of 4.3%. Since our
simulationwill run through 2050,we choose 5% for the common capital depreciation
rate based on the observation by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) that capital
depreciation rates tend to increase over time.
The discount factor is calibrated to match the capital Euler equation to the
average data across the simulation sample economies over the period 1975–2011.
Specifically, we plug in the parameter values of θ and δ, and the data averages into
β =










The annual hours worked are set at 3,500 to correspond with the maximum
number of hours a person can work each year if we assume 14 hours per day for
5 days per week for 50 weeks per year. The preference weight,, is set at 0.5, which










(h¯ − ht )
ht
where the 2011 average estimated labor income tax is 0.12, the young population
ratio is 0.88, and the consumption share of GDP is 0.56. The average number of
hours worked in our sample is roughly 2,150, which is actually higher than the 2011
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average of 1,900. However, the average number of hours worked tends to decline
as economies develop.4 For example, the OECD’s average number of hours worked
per year per worker is 1,770.
C. Shooting Algorithm
Weuse the data for capital stock in 2011 and the projected exogenous variables
to solve for the time paths of the endogenous variables, {yt , ct , it , ht , kt+1}
T
t=0, such
that the above five equations—(3), (7), (8), (9), and (10)—hold for all periods.
In order to solve this problem, we use the shooting algorithm, which numerically
solves the system of ordinary difference equations with boundary conditions. In
our model, the key difference equation is the capital Euler equation. We set the
boundary condition such that the economy reaches its balanced growth path in 2050
and capital stock grows at the rate implied by productivity growth between periods
T and T+ 1. We essentially solve for trajectories of the capital stock, which satisfies
the equilibrium conditions for every period, and choose the one that satisfies the
boundary condition.5
D. Results
The simulation results are shown in Figures 5a–5f. Figure 5a shows the
simulated output path from the model with population aging and population
shrinking, which we define as the benchmark model. This figure shows that
demographic effects are harmful for economic growth.
Figure 5b decomposes the demographic effects into population aging and
population shrinking. Population aging is harmful for economic growth as it leads
to a decline in the size of the workforce. It also hinders capital accumulation by
reducing the marginal product of capital, which further harms economic growth.
Population shrinking, on the other hand, enhances economic growth by easing the
capital dilution effect; that is, when the population growth rate is low, the future
capital stock will be shared among fewer people such that the return to capital
increases and capital accumulation is encouraged.
Figure 5c shows the simulation result when government consumption
increases due to population aging. This channel actually helps economic growth
as the more the government increases consumption, the more the household will
have to pay in taxes. This leads to a negative income effect, causing the household
to increase the number of hours worked. Capital accumulation accelerates as the
4Otsu (2009) shows that the decline in hours worked during the postwar recovery period in Japan can be
accounted for by income effects generated through subsistence consumption. Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson (2008)
argue that labor income tax is the main driver of long-run trends in labor in OECD member countries.
5Please see Otsu and Shibayama (2016) for more details on this method.
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Figure 5a. The Benchmark Model
PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5b. Demographic Effects
PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
marginal product of capital increases. However, the difference between the results
from this model and the benchmark model is small.
In Figures 5d and 5e, we show the results when population aging leads to
an increase in the labor income tax and a decline in productivity, respectively.
These channels clearly harm economic growth. An increase in the labor income
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Figure 5c. Model with Demographic Effect on Productivity
PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5d. Model with Demographic Effect on Government Consumption
PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
tax discourages the household from working and thus reduces the marginal product
of capital. Productivity affects output directly through the production function and
indirectly through the marginal product of inputs.
Figure 5f shows the result with all channels included. The sum of the
combination of the three effects will reduce GDP per adult by 20% by 2050.
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Figure 5e. Model with Demographic Effect on Labor Income Tax
PPP = purchasing power parity, US = United States.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5f. Full Model
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3 breaks down the effects into annual growth rates. The model without
demographic effects predicts an average annual growth rate of 2.7%, while the
benchmark model predicts an average annual growth rate of 2.3%. The demographic
effect through government consumption increases the average annual growth rate by
0.05 percentage points. The demographic effect through the labor income tax and
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Table 3. Average Annual Growth Rates of GDP per Adult
Difference from Benchmark
Model Growth Rate (percentage points)
No demographic effect 2.70% 0.55
Benchmark 2.25% 0
With government consumption 2.30% 0.05
With labor income tax 1.85% –0.40
With productivity 1.90% –0.35
With all channels 1.60% –0.65
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
productivity reduces the average annual growth rate by 0.4 percentage points and
0.35 percentage points, respectively. The model with all channels included reduces
the growth rate by 0.65 percentage points.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we took demographic projections as given and computed
long-run economic growth in Asian economies using a neoclassical growth model.
We find that population aging is harmful for growth due to the decline in the size of
the workforce, while population shrinking is helpful for growth due to the capital
dilution effect. Overall, the population aging effect will dominate, reducing the
average annual economic growth rate by 0.55 percentage points below its potential.
We also consider channels through which population aging affect government
consumption, labor income tax, and productivity. We find that an increase in
government consumption helps growth slightly, but an increase in the labor income
tax and the decline in productivity growth have major effects on growth.
As the main focus of this paper is to identify ways to simulate aggregate
output, we omitted several important aspects of the typical economy. First, we do
not allow the household to adjust labor at the extensive margin. It would be
interesting to consider a life cycle model with an endogenous retirement choice
as an extension of our model. Second, while we assume that population aging will
affect labor income tax through a social security payroll tax, we do not explicitly
model for redistribution across the young and the aged population. In order to take
this into account, we may need an overlapping generations structure. It would be
interesting to see whether this redistribution channel has important implications for
aggregate output growth. Finally, we do not explicitly model how population aging
affects government consumption and productivity. Our assumption is that population
aging increases demand for public services, which generally have lower levels of
productivity than private services. It would be interesting to see if a two-sector model
calibrated to an aging economy can replicate our results. As these issues are beyond
the scope of this paper, we will leave them for future research.
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